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The aim of this work is to elucidate John F. W. Herschel’s distinctive contribution to the inductivist 
tradition in the philosophy of science by (i) discussing his explicit views on experimental methods and 
the successes of experimental inquiry within his Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy and (ii) 
proposing an epistemology of experiment adequate to support his claims about the epistemic value of 
experiment in scientific inquiry. I argue that the most basic principle underlying Herschel’s epistemology 
of experiment is that experiment enables a particular kind of lower-level experimental knowledge or 
understanding of phenomena. Experimental practices provide knowledge of a particular phenomenon as 
a genuine effect produced under precise material conditions whose connections with other phenomena 
can be traced by variations in experimental parameters. The orienting concern of experimental inquiry 
seems to be the production of this secure knowledge of phenomena as such even if it has no direct 
theoretical significance. Insofar as one can generate such experimental understanding, it can function 
both as a fertile source for explanatory principles about phenomena and as body of evidence against 
which one can test the adequacy of an explanatory hypothesis. Thus, experimental understanding of 
phenomena is the substantive basis upon which one can draw inferences concerning the ultimate causes 
of phenomena. For Herschel, then, it seems that theoretical speculation is legitimate only if there is an 
adequate experimental understanding of phenomena upon which one can ground proposed explanatory 
hypotheses or theories.  
 
Complicating this analysis, however, is the fact that Herschel does not provide a systematic analysis 
experiment in his Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy; he catalogs various kinds of experiment 
and the functions they serve but provides no cohesive or unifying account of the normative epistemic 
principles grounding experimental inquiry. Although he extols the importance of experiment in scientific 
inquiry, Herschel fails to specify how or why experimental methods are capable of fulfilling their 
important evidentiary functions. For this reason, it is instructive to look beyond Herschel’s philosophical 
reflections on the nature of experiment and to consider his own experimental work. Herschel’s 
discussion of the processes of actual experimental research from the conceptualization of experiments 
to the explanation of experimental results can provide insight into the epistemic principles underlying 
his understanding of experimental inquiry.   
 
In this paper, I consider a set of experiments Herschel performed with the assistance of Charles Babbage 
concerning a set of novel electromagnetic phenomena. In particular, these experiments focused on the 
communication of magnetism between physical bodies.  A particularly troubling species of this general 
phenomenon was the ability of supposedly non-magnetic bodies, like copper, to communicate or induce 
magnetism in neighboring bodies. Originally discovered by Dominique François Arago, this phenomenon 
called into question the received theoretical view that there were some substances that could not be 
made to produce magnetic effects. In fact, in the Preliminary Discourse, Herschel argued that Arago’s 
discoveries provided substantial, and nearly complete, evidence that “there is no substance but which, 
under the proper circumstances, is capable of exhibiting unequivocal signs of the magnetic virtue” (325). 
Thus, it was unclear whether one could draw a strict demarcation between magnetic and non-magnetic 
substances.  
 
Important theoretical advances in electromagnetism gave further significance to this phenomenon. By 
the early 1820s, André-Marie Ampère had proposed and defended—on both experimental and 
theoretical grounds—the view that magnetism was an effect of the activity of intermolecular electrical 
currents. One consequence of this view was that substances that do not conduct electricity should not 
be able to exhibit or produce magnetic effects. But Arago’s effect seemed to indicate that all substances, 
even those substances thought to be non-conductive, could produce or exhibit magnetic effects. Hence, 
it was unclear how to reconcile Ampère’s well-grounded electrodynamic theory with this novel 
evidence.  
 
 These theoretical contexts served as a catalyst for Herschel’s and Babbage’s experiments, but the 
experiments they conducted were not intended to test the adequacy of these theoretical views. 
Herschel’s and Babbage’s immediate goal was to understand the phenomenon itself. They were not 
initially or even primarily concerned with providing an explanatory account of the cause, or causes, of 
these enigmatic phenomena. It was only after they had developed an adequate experimental 
understanding of the phenomenon in question that they brought these to bear upon theoretical 
questions. And even then, their goal was not to settle the theoretical questions decisively; rather, they 
merely formulated some principles that they believed any adequate theory of the underlying productive 
causes of the phenomenon in question must explain.  
 
 Within the context of Herschel’s philosophy of science, there are three main reasons to focus on these 
particular experiments. First, in the Preliminary Discourse, Herschel maintains that the emergence of the 
science of electromagnetism from the distinct scientific study of electricity and magnetism provides an 
excellent example of the success of experimental inquiry in the sciences. Thus, it seems likely that 
Herschel’s experimental work within this domain may provide some indication of his understanding of 
the normative epistemic features of experimental inquiry. Second, given the relative infancy of the 
science of electromagnetism, Herschel’s experimental work within this domain sheds light on one of the 
hallmark features of an inductivist understanding of the sciences—that is, the slow and cautious steps 
by which experimentalists move from particular observations to proposed explanatory principles. Third, 
closer scrutiny of his work in this domain is likely to provide some indication of Herschel’s attitudes 
towards the legitimacy of hypothetical speculation within an inductivist philosophy of science. The 
importance of this final point should not be underestimated given that it was a point of serious 
contention among his fellow 19th-century British inductivists William Whewell and John Stuart Mill.   
 
